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Abstract: This article focuses on the contents of two nineteenth-century letters 
which discuss the allocation of income among the partners of a leading Anglo-
American merchant banking firm, the House of Brown. The writers debate alterna-
tive methods of valuing assets and determining yearly income. In addition, the 
handling of doubtful accounts and their subsequent collection is examined. In both 
letters the writers argue for the development of clearly defined accounting princi-
ples and consistency in applying them. These letters reveal that an unusually high 
degree of financial sophistication had emerged in the merchant banking field by 
the 1850s. 
While much of the recent historical literature has been devoted 
to analyses of business and railroad operations in the nineteenth 
century, the accounting methods and contributions of banking firms 
have remained relatively unexplored.1 Now two previously unpub-
lished letters written in the mid-nineteenth century by partners of 
the House of Brown, a leading Anglo-American merchant banking 
firm, offer new insight into the evolution of accounting methods 
and the emerging degree of sophistication in accounting thought. 
These letters indicate that some of the senior members of the firm 
were acutely aware of the problems associated with the develop-
ment of principles and procedures for determining and allocating 
partnership profits in an equitable and consistent manner. The 
issues which stimulated discussion within the firm were con-
troversies over, first, alternative methods of valuing assets and con-
sequently the calculation of yearly income and, second, the collec-
tion of funds on doubtful accounts which had been written off 
directly against the senior partners' capital accounts. In both letters 
the writers expressed very conservative attitudes about the valua-
tion of assets and the measurement of income. 
The firm was founded in 1800 by Alexander Brown, who emigrated 
to Baltimore from Ireland in the 1790s. Beginning as a linen mer-
chant, Brown soon expanded his activities to include the merchan-
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dising of other products, shipping, and the provision of various 
financial services. His four sons eventually joined the business, and 
by 1825 three of them had established branches of the partner-
ship in Philadelphia, New York, and Liverpool.2 By midcentury, the 
firm had become the market leader in two major Anglo-American 
financial markets—the issuance of letters of credit to American 
importers and the buying and selling of foreign exchange in the 
United States. Profits were so high in these specialized fields that 
the two senior partners who held the bulk of the firm's capital— 
William Brown in Liverpool and James Brown in New York— 
decided, in the 1850s, to embark on a program of diversification 
by making "outside" investments in railroad securities, trans-
atlantic passenger ships (the famous Collins Line), and other 
properties. Some of the junior partners opposed these outside in-
vestments calling them unduly speculative; the leaders of this 
group were two non-family members of the firm residing in England, 
Francis Hamilton and Mark Collet (later Governor of the Bank of 
England), who had assumed day-to-day administrative control of 
the Liverpool branch in 1853. 
Eventually, many of these peripheral investments did, in fact, 
decline in market value, just as Collet and Hamilton had feared. 
This setback intensified the debate within the partnership about 
the merits of investing partnership funds in railroad stocks and 
bonds. It led to discussions of the valuation of assets generally. As 
the following letter from Collet and Hamilton so succinctly reveals, 
the problem of declining asset values stimulated a lively discussion 
about the application of a "cost or market" approach in determining 
the partnership's income for 1856:3 
Persia Private 
Liverpool 12 Nov. 1856 
Messers Brown Brothers & Co. 
New York 
Dear Sirs: 
We exceedingly regret that there should exist between us any 
difference of opinion, as to the mode of treating assets, not immedi-
ately convertible, in the yearly statement of accounts, but we trust 
the difference may be rather apparent than real, & that you have 
only misunderstood our meaning. 
2
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What we intended to propose was not that every asset should be 
absolutely sold & turned into actual Cash on the 30 Novr. & that 
every asset not so converted should be written off to Profit & Loss; 
but, that every asset should be reduced on the Books to such a 
sum as it could, beyond a doubt, be actually sold for, within a 
reasonable space (say of weeks or months, but not of years); and 
that everything beyond such actual money value—whether the 
assets be absolutely worthless, or only doubtful—should be written 
off. In fact, as we view it, there is only one process by which the 
profits of a current business can be "ascertained"; namely by 
comparing the liabilities with the assets, after both have been re-
duced to their cash value on the day, up to which the profits are 
to be calculated; by means of the interest account this is done most 
accurately with the Liabilities; but, if in dealing with the Assets; 
prospective values are applied to them which may or may not be 
realized at some future day, instead of bringing them to their 
present Cash value, a totally different standard is at once applied 
to the assets, & the result can only show an amount of "assumed", 
but not of "ascertained" profits. 
We are not insensible to the disadvantage which under our 
present partnership agreement might accrue to the heirs of a 
junior partner by this strict course; and Wm Brown, having his at-
tention drawn to it by your remarks, is willing & suggests that a 
supplementary article should be introduced to preserve to the heirs 
of juniors their just interest in the Bad Debt Account; and he writes 
to his brother to this effect by the present conveyance. 
On the other hand it may not perhaps have occurred to you that 
if assets are left on the Books at nominal amounts beyond their con-
vertible value, the Senior Partners are placed at a corresponding 
disadvantage under their obligation to pay off a junior in Cash at the 
rate of the previous years profits; which would of course have been 
less had the assets been appraised upon what appears to us the 
only sound principle. 
Further, for the last three or four years, large amounts have had 
to be written off annually to supply the inadequate provisions made 
for Bad Debts, at the time they occurred; & upon these sums, which 
for the time swelled the profits, we have been all along paying a 
heavy Income tax. 
But all such questions as these are quite minor & unimportant 
when compared with the grand objection, that by retaining assets 
on the Books at sums [other] than their convertible value, & so 
dividing profits which have not been fully earned, a most insidious 
3
Perkins and Levinson: Partnership accounting in a nineteenth century merchant banking house
Published by eGrove, 1980
62 The Accounting Historians Journal, Spring, 1980 
& deceptive principle is admitted, which has no single advantage 
to recommend it, but on the contrary is fraught with serious dangers. 
Within our own memory American Houses that felt fully confi-
dent of their position, as we do now, have been brought to ruin by it; 
first bolstering up questionable accounts or bad debts with fresh 
advances, instead of facing out the loss at first, and then retaining 
the assets upon their Books at nominal values, which, if they were 
not purely arbitrary, could only have been realized under some 
concurrence of circumstances, which was waited for in vain; in the 
meantime they shut their eyes to the dangers of a system, which 
could not be remedied except at a serious sacrifice, until it slowly, 
but surely, brought them down. Smaller concerns, from their limited 
means are comparatively exempt from this risk; but it is the peculiar 
snare which lies in the way of large Houses with extensive means 
& unbounded credit, and in this light it does seem to us of vital 
importance that we should not give place to so dangerous a prin-
ciple in any form or shape. We have no other object that the com-
mon interest of all in urging these views upon you, & we sincerely 
trust that they will of themselves receive your approbation & be 
adopted. 
We are, 
Dear Sirs 
Yours faithfully, 
Brown Shipley & Co. 
Although it is impossible to determine exactly what developments 
and forces influenced the Liverpool partners' consideration of ac-
counting principles, this correspondence did coincide with several 
legislative alterations in English financial laws. The Joint Stock 
Companies Act of 1856 passed Parliament just prior to the writing 
of this letter. Because the new law prescribed new financial prac-
tices for certain business organizations, public discussion of the 
act had stimulated in England a reappraisal of basic accounting 
concepts.4 
Specifically, the Joint Stock Companies Act required that the 
directors of each corporation "cause true Accounts to be kept": 
Of the Stock in Trade of the Company; Of the Sums of 
Money received and expended by the Company, and the 
Matter in respect of which such Receipt and Expenditure 
takes place; and Of the Credits and Liabilities of the Com-
pany.5 
4
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 7 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol7/iss1/5
Perkins and Levinson: Partnership Accounting 63 
The annual presentation of income statements was required so that 
"a just Balance of Profit and Loss may be laid before the Meeting." 
Furthermore, the act specified that "a Balance Sheet shall be made 
out in every Year, and laid before the General Meeting of the Com-
pany, and such Balance Sheet shall contain a Summary of the 
Property and Liabilities of the Company. . ."6 
The act did not specifically address the issue of valuation of 
assets nor did it detail the preparation of financial statements. 
However, the mere fact that for the first time presentation of ac-
curate financial statements was required by law may have stimulated 
discussion of accounting principles. 
Aside from these legislative actions, we have been unable to 
discover any direct stimulus for Hamilton and Collet's interest in 
the lower of cost or market principle. However, the principle had 
clearly been introduced into accounting thought by the mid-nine-
teenth century. A. C. Littleton in an article, "The Geneology of 
Lower of Cost or Market," traces application of the principle to 
fourteenth-century Italy, when a very heavy tax burden may have 
been an incentive for recognizing all possible losses.7 During the 
seventeenth century French businessmen seem to have adopted 
the practice of writing down slow inventories, but Littleton argues 
that it was done primarily for the purpose of determining the degree 
of solvency. By 1862, J. Sawyer referred to the "recognized prin-
ciple that stock should be valued at least at cost price (unless 
depreciated in value) and that no profit should be estimated until 
realized."8 Meanwhile, we are unaware of any Anglo-American ac-
counting literature that discusses the issue of lower of cost or 
market in terms of its impact on the measurement of income. It is 
conceivable that Collet and Hamilton's letter represents one of the 
earliest preserved discussions of this topic. 
In a second letter written four years later, Collet and Hamilton 
focused on inconsistencies in the handling of bad debts and sub-
sequent collections on delinquent accounts:9 
Niagaria Private 
Messers Brown Brothers & Co. 
New York 
Dear Sirs: 
Referring to your private letter of 5 March about the private 
accounts, we see nothing to remark upon, except this: there ap-
Liverpool 24 March 
1860 
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pears to us an inconsistency in the principles upon which some 
accounts are brought under the operation of the Suspense Account 
& others excluded; we do not wish to raise the question by corre-
spondence; indeed it could never have arisen had the principle 
been clearly defined in 1857, on what terms the Seniors assumed 
the Juniors' losses; but to illustrate the inconsistency that presents 
itself to our minds, we could say that if all the Surplus that may be 
realized from Mathison & Litchfield is to go to Credit of the 
Suspense Acct, (even beyond the amount specifically written off in 
1857) then the loss written off in 1859 for the Thompson property 
should have gone to the Suspense A/c too; but if the latter was 
properly charged to Profit & Loss A/c, then any recoveries beyond 
the Sums which were specifically written off in 1857 should revert 
to the Profit & Loss account of the year when the recovery is 
made. The question in fact turns upon this — whether the Seniors 
guaranteed the Juniors for losses beyond what the Amt. placed to 
Suspense A/c 1857 would satisfy? If they did, then they should 
bear the loss upon Thompson's property, on the ground that it 
was a lock-up, left standing at an estimated value; & then too they 
are entitled to all recoveries from the assets as they then stood; 
but if, as we conceived at the time—the Seniors did not engage to 
supply anything more (if needed) than the Suspense account would 
suffice to cover, then the loss [on] Thompson's property has been 
correctly charged last year to Profit & Loss; but then also the 
recoveries beyond losses specifically provided for (& not left to 
be worked out under the gross estimate) should also go to Profit 
& Loss. It is inconvenient now to settle the point when there is no 
longer any doubt as to the out-turn of the Suspense Account, viz. 
that it will be more than sufficient to pay all losses, and of the two 
original alternatives only one remains; and we do not wish or ask 
you to discuss it by letter; but only to settle it on your side before 
Mr. J. M. Brown comes out, so that we can have an understanding 
about it, when we can discuss it verbally. 
Yours faithfully, 
Brown Shipley & Co. 
To place this second item of correspondence in the proper con-
text, it is necessary to know that during the financial panic of 1857 
many American importers holding letters of credit from Anglo-
American merchant bankers got into serious financial difficulties. 
In many cases the merchant banking firms in England who had 
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faithfully met their obligations under letter of credit agreements 
were not fully reimbursed by their American customers. Because 
the Browns had been cautious in issuing letters of credit and had 
usually insisted on a margin of 20 percent in tangible assets against 
contingent liabilities arising under their letters of credit, the firm 
had weathered this crisis in much better shape than most com-
petitors. Nonetheless, the firm did face the possibility of absorbing 
some losses. In these cases, the Browns retained the assets as-
signed to them as an initial margin and occasionally they received 
additional collateral from importers hoping to survive the panic. 
To record these immediate losses and potential losses, the 
Brown partnership used at least two different methods.10 Some 
moderate losses were simply written off against the partnership's 
profit and loss statement in 1857. In this instance, the losses were 
shared by both the junior and senior partners according to the 
pre-arranged agreement about the allocation of profits and losses. 
In the second method, the senior partners, James and William 
Brown, agreed to permit writeoffs against their individual capital 
accounts. Debits were made to a "suspense account" which was a 
contra-account to the senior partners' capital accounts. The goal 
of this magnanimous policy was to protect the other members of 
the partnership from the possibility of incurring unusually high 
losses in the event most of the questionable debts in 1857 were 
never fully collected. The amounts written off to the seniors' capital 
accounts were normally only a portion of a specific account that 
was considered doubtful, and the remaining balance was left stand-
ing on the partnership's balance sheet at its currently "estimated" 
value. This procedure seems to have been at the root of the prob-
lems which arose in later years. 
By 1860 the House of Brown had recovered nearly all the 
amounts written off to the suspense accounts of 1857. At this point, 
questions emerged about how to record the recovery of the col-
lected amounts. In those cases in which the senior partners had 
assumed personal liability for at least a partial loss on a specific 
account, it was not clear whether the collected amount was to be 
credited in its entirety to their contra-accounts or whether that sum 
should be divided as follows—with an amount credited to the sus-
pense accounts equal to the original writeoff and the excess 
credited to the general partnership. The question could be stated 
as follows: at the time of the debits to the capital contra-accounts 
was there created thereby an implied agreement that the senior 
partners had assumed full responsibility for all potential losses on 
7
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the designated accounts? If that interpretation was correct, then 
Collet and Hamilton felt that the seniors were indeed entitled to 
benefit individually from all sums collected, including the amounts 
above original writeoffs. But, on the other hand, if the senior 
partners had assumed liability for only a portion of the potential 
loss on a specific account, then any excess should accrue instead 
to the general partnership. 
Because the matter had never been settled in 1857, uncertainties 
remained about accounting procedures. In their letter Collet and 
Hamilton noted that in 1859 the firm had finally recognized a loss 
on the Thompson account which was in excess of the amount 
originally placed in the senior partners' suspense accounts. In 
that case, the additional loss was charged to the partnership ac-
counts and was consequently borne by all members of the firm. 
Now in 1860, the seniors proposed to credit all the sums collected 
from Mathison & Litchfield to their contra-accounts, including the 
amounts beyond the original writeoff. Collet and Hamilton felt that 
the handling of the two situations was inconsistent. 
Unfortunately, we do not know how this matter was finally re-
solved. Yet it is interesting to note the intricacies which surrounded 
the drafting and interpretation of partnership agreements formulated 
over 100 years ago. Although we cannot point in this case to any 
external events which might have stimulated this discussion, we 
are aware of several developments inside the firm that almost cer-
tainly played some role in encouraging an interest in refining ac-
counting procedures. 
By the 1850s, the House of Brown was no longer a small family 
business, but a medium-sized enterprise with seven branch offices 
and several non-family members. Moreover, all the members were 
committed to preserving the business for their heirs, which suggests 
the emerging concept of an on-going concern. Because the firm 
actually had two main offices—one in New York and another in 
Liverpool—there was internal pressure to commit all major policies 
and operating rules to paper for later reference. The rapidly in-
creasing volume of business after midcentury also placed greater 
demands on regularizing procedures. Part of this process was the 
desire by some firm members for a uniform, well-specified system 
of accounting. In concert, these factors made preestablished rules 
increasingly desirable for continued harmony within the partner-
ship. 
Collet and Hamilton were among the most vocal advocates of 
the benefits of uniformity. In both letters, they lamented the ab-
8
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sence of consistency in handling the partnership accounts; in 1860, 
they argued that "had the principle been clearly defined" at the 
outset, the subsequent debate could have been avoided. The prob-
lems of maintaining consistency demonstrates clearly the growing 
need for outside accounting authorities and specialists, who could 
relieve the partners of the additional burden of establishing the 
firm's own accounting criteria. Since neither England nor the 
United States had an active accounting association in the 1850s, 
it became the responsibility of individual managers to establish 
their own rules for valuing assets, measuring income, and handling 
doubtful accounts. 
From another historical perspective, it is intriguing to examine 
the interchange of accounting thought between the United States 
and Great Britain. Previously, James Edwards has argued that 
"just as customs, common law, and commercial practice came 
to the United States from England and Scotland, so did the practice 
of accountancy."11 In contrast, R. A. Irish favors the United States 
as the source of much fresh thinking about accounting principles: 
"This new country, uninhibited by tradition, brought forth an exami-
nation of accounting fundamentals which was free of inborn 
European prejudices."12 In this one instance, the letters originated 
in England, however, which raises questions about Irish's views but 
supports Edward's position. More research on the origin of fresh 
accounting thinking is clearly in order. 
In conclusion, these two letters offer insights on the evolution of 
accounting practices and thought during the mid-nineteenth 
century. The debate inside the Brown firm focused on the drafting 
and amending of a fair partnership agreement and the judicious 
interpretation of its provisions. The letters provide evidence of the 
increased emphasis on the measurement and distribution of in-
come. The letters indicate that the increased complexity and larger 
volume of business led many partners to attempt to establish 
permanent guidelines for accounting procedures which might avoid 
ad hoc discussions of financial principles in future years. In formu-
lating and applying these guidelines, Francis Hamilton and Mark 
Collet, two of the firm's non-family, English partners, saw con-
sistency as a crucial factor. In addition, they advocated a con-
servative attitude toward valuing assets on the firm's balance sheet 
and in the measurement of income. Finally, this need for consistent, 
standardized procedures later spread throughout the business en-
vironment and created a favorable climate for the establishment 
of a cohesive accounting profession. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1G. A. Lee, "The Concept of Profit in British Accounting, 1760-1900," Business 
History Review (September, 1975), provides a general survey of the advance of 
accounting principles during this period. Other sources which provide background 
are Edey and Panitakdi, "British Company Accounting and the Law: 1844-1900," in 
Littleton and Yamey, eds., Studies in the History of Accounting (Homewood, Ill.: 
R. D. Irwin, Inc., 1956); M. Chatfield, A History of Accounting Thought (Hinsdale, 
Ill., Dryden Press, 1974); Nicholas Stacey, English Accountancy: A Study in Social 
and Economic History, 1800-1954 (London: Gee, 1954); and A. C. Littleton, Ac-
counting Evolution to 1900 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966). 
2The history of the firm is found in Edwin J. Perkins, Financing Anglo-American 
Trade, 1800-1880 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975). 
3Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. Papers. 
4ln the chapter entitled "Development of Experts in Accounts," A. C. Littleton, 
in his Accounting Evolution to 1900, discusses the ebb and flow of business during 
the nineteenth century and correlates these movements with the growth of social 
control through statutory regulation of public works and joint stock companies. 
5Collection of the Public General Statutes, p. 433. 
6Collection of the Public General Statutes, pp. 433-434. 
7A. C. Littleton, "A Genealogy for Cost or Market," The Accounting Review 
(June, 1941). For further discussion of the history of this principle see R. H. 
Parker, "Lower of Cost or Market in Britain and the United States: An Historical 
Survey," Abacus, I (1965), and Kenneth O. Elvick, "Acquisition Cost Versus Revalu-
ation: A Historical Perspective," The International Journal of Accounting, IX (1974). 
8Sawyer, p. 158. 
9Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. Papers. 
10For discussions on the use of reserves for bad debts, see M. Chatfield, A His-
tory of Accounting Thought, p. 83, and A. C. Littleton, Accounting Thought to 1900, 
p. 301. 
11Edwards, p. 144. 
12lrish, p. 63. Also see G. J. Previts, "Origins of American Accounting," The 
CPA Journal, XLCI (May, 1976). 
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